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The paper empirically investigates whether people’s attitude towards the progress in political 
transformation in Eastern Europe are influenced by economic factors. Thereby it addresses the 
question of independence between economic and political system. Using a large panel data 
set, containing about 68000 observations on individuals from 19 countries over 6 years, this 
question is analysed in the framework of an appropriately adjusted ordered logit model. It is 
found that both subjective and objective personal economic experiences, such as the 
development of the financial situation of the household or its position in the income 
distribution, as well as objective aggregate data, such as inflation or the private sector share, 
have a significant influence on people’s opinion with respect to progress in democratisation. 
Thus, studies on transition countries should take into account that there appear to be important 
spill-overs from people’s economic experience to their assessment of progress in 
transformation of the political system.  
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The economic and political transition in Eastern Europe has not been completed at this point 
in time. One of the debated questions is whether two core aspects of transformation – 
reforming the political and the economic system – are closely linked (see Rose et al. (1998)). 
The current paper takes up this basic argument and puts the hypothesis of a close linkage 
between political and economic transformation to the test. So far, most studies have 
concentrated on the spill-over from democratisation on the performance of the economy (see 
De Melo et al. (1996), Dethier et al. (1999), Fidrmuc (2000)). If we find evidence on the 
influence of economic factors on the way progress in democracy is perceived then these 
empirical approaches are potentially suffering from a simultaneous-equation bias. Contrary to 
these studies in the literature, endogeneity is not a big problem for the present analysis, the 
reason being that it uses micro data on individuals, namely the Central and Eastern 
Eurobarometers (CEEB). There will not be an endogeneity problem as it is unlikely that an 
individual person’s satisfaction with democratisation affects aggregate economic variables 
such as inflation, openness, private sector share or employment.  
There is a related study by Kunioka and Woller (1999), who build upon the work by Rose et 
al. (1998) and specifically look at the influence of social capital on support for democratic 
procedures in Eastern Europe. As part of this analysis, they also consider the effects of 
economic variables. However, the dependent variable is different, support versus satisfaction, 
as studied here, the data base is different, New Democracy Barometers versus CEEB, and 
they only consider a cross-section, while this paper utilises a panel data set over time and 
countries.  
A related issue, which can be partially addressed using our results, is whether it is useful to 
distinguish between progress in introducing a market economy versus progress in 
democratisation. The finding of a linkage between the economic and political systems may 
support the argument that transformation in Eastern Europe is not really about introducing a 
market economy on the one hand and creating a democracy on the other hand: instead it is 
about copying the “Western model” which reflects both of these characteristics (cf. Offe 
(1991)). Arguably, the Western model is seen by Eastern Europeans as one whole package 
and not as consisting of easily separable parts. If this is true then the idea that transformation 
in Eastern Europe could in principle take place similar to the “Asian way”, that means 
keeping authoritarian structures in the political system and introducing market reforms in the 
economic system, is not very convincing.   
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In this paper a large survey data set is utilised to investigate the influence of individual and 
aggregate economic variables on the public’s satisfaction with progress in democracy. If the 
hypothesis about the interconnection between economics and politics is right, then we should 
find that micro and macroeconomic conditions will affect people’s assessment of democratic 
reforms. In the data set, microeconomic conditions are being measured by the relative income 
position of the respondent, and the relative changes in his financial situation compared to past 
and future. Macroeconomic influences are introduced by including national macroeconomic 
variables.  
Along another dimension we can also categorise variables as either reflecting objective or 
subjective economic conditions. All of the macroeconomic variables - as well as the relative 
income position - can be considered as representing objective indicators. The comparison of 
the current financial situation with the past and the future gives us subjective indicators of 
people’s economic situation.  
The analysis takes place in the framework of a non-standard ordered logit model that allows 
for the inclusion of variables measured at different levels of aggregation. This makes it 
possible to take standard errors seriously and to model within a general-to-specific strategy 
(see Hendry (1990)).  
Section 2 summarises the empirical approach and describes the data base. The results of the 
regression analysis are being discussed in Section 3, and at the end of the paper, a short 
conclusion is put forward. 
 
 
2. Empirical Approach and Data Base 
 
The data base employed here combines several Central and Eastern Eurobarometer surveys 
(CEEB) conducted on behalf of the European Commission across time – from 1990 to 1996 – 
and countries (up to 21) in the form of a panel. Table A in the Appendix gives a summary of 
the countries covered by every one of the surveys and the year (usually in late Autumn) when 
the field work was undertaken.  
Although there already exist a number of studies utilising this data base to analyse questions 
about political and economic aspects of transformation, so far little work has been done to 
investigate the spill-over of one into the other (see Rose et al. (1998), Kunioka and Waller 
(1999)). Probably due to the technical difficulties involved in implementing a valid 
econometric model, no work at all has been done using both individual and macro level  
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variables when studying this question. Even very recent empirical studies combining micro 
and macro variables rely on an inefficient two-step method (see, for instance, Di Tella et al. 
(2000)).  
Papers using single CEEB surveys on political aspects include Juchler (1994), and Pickel and 
Pickel (1996), and some economic aspects are being discussed in Hayo (1997a, 1997b). 
Aggregating the CEEB studies over time and countries to form a panel is rather unique, and 
the only other paper utilising such an approach is Hayo (1999). Combining surveys gives the 
advantage of obtaining a very large data base in both country and time dimension. The 
number of valid observations is about 68000, drawn from 19 countries and 6 years. A 
disadvantage of this approach is that the number of variables that have been consistently 
recorded across all of these surveys is relatively small.  
The dependent variable of this study is people’s satisfaction with the development of 
democracy in their country (DEMO), which can be interpreted as giving information about 
the satisfaction with the transformation a communist-style political system into a democracy. 
The precise question and coding can be found in Table 1, together with the other individual-
level variables employed here.  
Of special interest for this study are the microeconomic indicators NEGNEG, POSPOS, 
POSNEG, and NEGPOS as indicators of the subjective economic situation, as well as 
INCOMEQ helping to describe the objective economic situation of the household.  
The indicators based on changes in the financial situation reflect different personal economic 
experiences. Respondents collected by the variable NEGNEG are those who experienced a 
deterioration in their financial situation compared to the past and who expect to be even worse 
off in the future. They can be called subjective losers of the economic transformation process. 
Those respondents who feel that their financial situation has improved compared to the past 
and is going to improve further in the future are coded in POSPOS. Correspondingly, we can 
call them subjective transition winners. Under the hypothesis of a connection between 
economic situation and political transformation we would expect that winners view the 
situation much more favourably than losers.  
The other two categories describe people experiencing a change in the trend of their financial 
situation. POSNEG captures those who did better compared to last year but who expect to be 
worse off next year, and NEGPOS is defined the other way around. These two categories are 
of interest, as they tell us something about the importance of expectations regarding a relative 
change in the financial situation of the household. If establishing democracy and economic  
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prosperity are linked then I would conjecture that those who expect a relative improvement in 
the future will be rather pleased with perceived progress in democracy and vice versa.  
 
Tab. 1: Substantial Variables and Coding 
Variable name  Question  Coding 
DEMO  On the whole, are you 
satisfied with the way 
democracy is developing? 
2: Very satisfied 
1: Fairly satisfied 
-1: Not satisfied 





Q1: Compare the current 
financial situation of your 
household with the one 12 
months ago! 
Q2: Over the next 12 
months, do you expect the 
financial situation of your 
household to change 
compared to today? 
POSPOS:   
1: if answer to Q1 and Q2 is “better” 
0: otherwise 
POSNEG:   
1: if answer to Q1 is “better” and Q2 “worse” 
0: otherwise 
NEGPOS:   
1: if answer to Q1 is “worse” and Q2 “better” 
0: otherwise 
NEGNEG:   
1: if answer to Q1 and Q2 is “worse” 
0: otherwise 
FEMALE  Gender   1: Female 
0: Male 
AGE  Age in years of respondent  Years 
AGESQ  Squared values of AGE  Years
2 
INCOMEQ  Income quartile of 
respondent 
4: Highest income quartile 
3: Upper middle income quartile 
2: Lower middle income quartile 
1: Lowest income quartile 
EDUCL  Level of education  4: Higher than secondary education 
3: Secondary education 
2: Some secondary or apprenticeship 




Finally, looking at IMCOMEQ gives a measure of the relative income situation of the 
household in his national economy. This can be considered an objective indicator on the 
individual level, as it is based on actual (reported) income. Again I would expect that those 
respondents who are relatively better off to be more satisfied with progress in democracy.  
 
The variables used to describe the macroeconomic conditions – which should be seen as 
providing information on the objective economic situation – are summarised in Table 2. 
INFLATION, GDPCAP, and EMP are key macroeconomic indicators, while OPENNESS is a 
proxy for the integration of the country into the world economy. Since unemployment data on 
Eastern European countries are unreliable for cross-country comparisons (United Nations 
(1997, p. 114f)), I use employment data measured as an index instead. Although employment 
is neither measured with great precision, it seems to be somewhat less distorted.  
 
Tab. 2: Aggregate Level Variables and Coding 
Variable name  Definition 
GDPCAP  GDP per capita in constant US Dollars, expressed as index (base: 1996) 
EMP  Employment expressed as an index (base: 1989) 
INFLATION  Inflation rate in % p.a. 
OPENNESS  Ratio of exports plus imports divided by 2 to GDP in US Dollars 
GOVGDP  Ratio of government expenditure to GDP in % 
GOVDEF  Ratio of government surplus to GDP in % (a deficit implies a negative value) 
PRIVSHAR  Private sector share in percent of GDP 
INTPRICE  Chained de Melo et al. (1996) and EBRD transition indicator (simple sum of 
index for price liberalisation and competition) 
EXTMARK  Chained de Melo et al. (1996) and EBRD transition indicator (index for trade 
and foreign exchange rate system) 
PRIVATE  Chained de Melo et al. (1996) and EBRD transition indicator (simple sum of 
index for large-scale and small-scale privatisation, and banking reform) 
Source: de Melo et al. (1996), EBRD Transition Report (1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998), UN Economic Survey 
of Europe (1997, 1998), Berg et al. (1999), own calculations.  
 
Fiscal policy is described by GOVGDP, PRIVSHARE, and GOVDEF. The first two variables 
are proxies for the involvement of the state in the economy. The further market reforms have 
progressed, the smaller will those ratios be. The last variable indicates the extent to which the  
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government tries to smooth the burden of transformation over time. This can be either seen as 
positive – future generations will benefit from introducing a market economy, hence they 
should bear a part of the burden – or negative, as it is unclear whether this money is in fact 
used to compensate transition losers and to prevent economic hardship.  
Finally, indicators for the progress achieved in economic transition as recorded by the EBRD, 
namely INTPRICE, PRIVATE and EXTMARK, are utilised in the analysis. Again, I would 
expect that the further a country has come in terms of economic transition, the more 
benevolent the political situation will be evaluated by its citizens.  
 
Before we come to the actual estimation of the model, a description of the dependent variable 
in the time dimension for all available countries is presented in Figure 1.  
 













































































Not at all   
 
 
We can be brief in summarising the trends, as the general tendency for most series is to stay 
relatively close to the ‘not satisfied’ category. Some interesting points are: There is a strong  
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increase in satisfaction in Albania after 1994.
1 The Czechs are relatively indeterminate about 
the development of democracy in their country and this position is quite stable over time. In 
Hungary, we also find that answers do not fluctuate a lot on average but people are rather 
dissatisfied with democracy. For Poland, the variations are larger, but in general the level of 
satisfaction is higher than in Hungary and – taking the average over time – close to that of the 
Czech Republic. The Baltic states show some variation in the development of satisfaction 
with democratisation over time, with Estonians being the least dissatisfied. Although we see 
similar average values for Latvia and Lithuania in 1996, the time dimension shows that people 
in Lithuania were quite satisfied in 1991 and then became less and less satisfied, while for 
Latvia we do not observe a notable trend.  
The most dissatisfied countries with the way democracy is developing are Bulgaria and 
Russia. Worrisome is the strong rise in dissatisfaction and that there is not much social 
disagreement on this issue, as indicated by a relatively small standard deviation. Belarus and 
Armenia are also countries where people do not view the development of democracy as very 
promising.  
To conclude, there seems to be a general feeling of dissatisfaction with the progress made in 
creating democratic political systems in Eastern Europe. Moreover, there appear to be 
considerable differences across countries and some variation across time. In the following 
section, the influence of economic variables on people’s attitudes towards progress in 
democracy will be analysed.  
 
 
3. Economic determinants of satisfaction with progress in democracy 
 
In Table 4, the results of a non-standard ordered logit model are presented; satisfaction with 
progress in democratisation is the dependent variable. The adjustment of the standard logit 
model is necessary in this context to account for different aggregation levels of the regressors, 
which is crucial for making valid inferences (see Moulton (1990)). The distribution 
assumption in the model is that observations across individuals within one country are not 
independently distributed (see Binder (1983), Skinner (1989)), which implies that we cannot 
use standard maximum likelihood techniques. However, to gain some additional degrees of 
freedom, the available information across time is taken into account when computing the 
standard errors for the statistical tests.  
                                                
1 Note that there seems to be a general upward bias in the values for Albania (see Hayo (1997b)).  
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The left part of Table 4 gives the unrestricted estimates containing all variables utilised in this 
study. Note that the coefficients give the influence of variables on the probability that an 
answer falls into one of the four categories. As it is apparent from the table, not all variables 
are statistically significant. We continue in a general-to-specific modelling procedure and 
eliminate those variables that are not jointly significant at a 5% significance level (F(10,67) = 
1.68). Operating with large-scale samples implies that we do not have to worry about 
marginally significant variables (see Leamer (1978)). The remaining variables are displayed 
in the right part of Table 4, and their effects on the attitude towards progress with respect to 
democracy will be discussed below.  
 
Tab. 4: Satisfaction with Democracy (1991-1996, adjusted ordered logit, 68372 cases) 
Independent Variables  General model  Simplified model 
Financial situation             
 NEGNEG  -0.93  **  (0.04)  -0.94  **  (0.03) 
 POSNEG  -0.06    (0.08)       
 NEGPOS  0.05    (0.04)       
 POSPOS  1.02  **  (0.07)  1.0  **  (0.07) 
 INCOMEQ  0.09  **  (0.01)  0.09  **  (0.01) 
Macro variables             
 INFLATION  -0.0001  ** (0.00003)  -0.00004  *  (0.00002) 
 GDPCAP  -0.003  *  (0.001)  -0.002  *  (0.001) 
 EMP  -0.02    (0.01)       
 OPENNESS  0.04    (0.53)       
Fiscal policy             
 GOVGDP  0.02    (0.02)       
 GOVDEF  0.05  *  (0.02)       
 PRIVSHARE  0.02  *  (0.01)  -0.02  *  (0.01) 
Transition indicators             
 INTPRICE  0.07    (0.62)       
 PRIVATE  0.93    (0.90)       




Socio-demographics             
 FEMALE  -0.05  **  (0.02)  -0.05  **  (0.02) 
 AGE  -0.03  **  (0.003)  -0.03  **  (0.003) 
 AGESQ  0.0003  **  (0.0003)  0.0003  **  (0.0003) 
 EDUCL  -0.0001    (0.01)       
Time fixed effects             
 D92  -0.60  *  (0.23)  -0.62  *  (0.25) 
 D93  -0.84  **  (0.24)  -0.72  *  (0.28) 
 D94  -1.48  **  (0.32)  -1.35  **  (0.34) 
 D95  -1.64  **  (0.35)  -1.48  **  (0.37) 
 D96  -1.40  **  (0.36)  -1.28  **  (0.39) 
F-test  F(42,35) = 61.2**  F(32,45) = 107.6** 
Pseudo-R
2  0.092  0.091 
Notes: Country dummies are always included. Moldova and Yugoslavia are excluded due to limited 
observations. Cut values have been omitted. Standard errors are given in brackets after coefficients. * (**) 
indicates significance at a level of 5% (1%). 
 
First, the results for the control variables are briefly noted but not commented upon (see Hayo 
(1999) for a more detailed analysis and the references therein). Regarding the time dummies, 
we find that compared to the base year 1991 all other years show less satisfaction with the 
progress made in democratisation. The minimum satisfaction occurred in 1995, and in 1996 a 
slight recovery has taken place. Education does not appear to have any explanatory power 
with respect to the question at hand.
2 Age has a significantly negative influence on people’s 
opinion towards progress in democracy. However, the non-linear term implies that minimum 
satisfaction occurs at an age of about 50 years. Regarding the gender dummy, women are 
more dissatisfied than men.  
Next, we come to the interpretation of the individual-level variables describing the 
respondents economic situation. The variables capturing the subjective evaluation of the 
financial situation in a comparison across time show slight evidence for an expectation effect 
                                                
2 The education variable is not recorded in a metric scale and one may be concerned that this is distorting results. 
An alternative is to split the variable up into dummy variables. A major disadvantage of such a procedure is that 
information about the ordering of categories is not used. However, I have re-estimated the model employing 
dummies for education, the coefficients of which are neither significant. Results are available upon request.  
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in the general model. People who expect to be better off in the future are also more satisfied 
with the political transformation even if they had to suffer income losses compared with the 
past and vice versa. However, the influence of the mixed financial situation variables is not 
significant, and we have to conclude that there is not much evidence in favour of a strong 
effect of expectations regarding changes in a household’s financial situation. 
What we find as a strong significant effect is that if people are better off compared to the past 
and expect to be even better off in the future, they will typically be more pleased with 
progress in democracy and vice versa. Thus subjective personal economic success (failure) 
has a positive (negative) impact on the attitude towards the democratisation process.  
Finally, the income quartile variable shows that relatively rich people are more satisfied with 
progress in political transformation.
3 This can be interpreted as an example of an objective 
economic variable having an effect at the individual level. As in the case of aggregate 
variables, I do not think there is a simultaneity problem, the reason being that it is unlikely 
that a person’s relative income position will be very much affected by his view on progress in 
democratisation.  
Regarding the variables collected at a macro level, the following conclusions can be drawn: 
First, employment has no significant effect. This may be due to the mentioned problems of 
adequately measuring the conditions in the labour markets. The transformation and openness 
indicators neither show robust effects. This negative finding applies also to the fiscal policy 
variables except the private sector share. If it were possible to disaggregate fiscal policy, for 
example by extracting transfer payments, results may have been different.  
Turning to the significant macroeconomic variables, we can see that inflation has a negative 
effect on satisfaction. The higher the inflation rate, the less satisfied are people with 
democratisation. Thus, inflation does not only reduce support for market reforms (see Hayo 
(1999)), it also decreases satisfaction with progress in reforming the political system. Thus 
low inflation rates can be seen as contributing towards stabilising public satisfaction with 
economic as well as political reforms.  
The GDP per capita index displays a negative sign. Respondents in countries that are 
characterised by a higher GDP index are less satisfied with the political transformation 
progress. An interpretation of this finding is that it may reflect a value change towards more 
post-materialistic values in a relatively more affluent society (see Inglehart (1977)). In other 
                                                
3 A similar point applies as mentioned in the previous footnote. Again I have checked that results are robust with 
respect to a split-up of the variable into dummies.  
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words, if living conditions have improved, people demand a similar amount of progress in 
political transformation.  
Finally, the higher the private sector share in GDP, the more satisfied people are with 
democratisation, and one can argue that democratisation is strengthened by privatisation. 
However, no influence was found when examining the effects of EBRD transition indicators.
4  
Hence, objective economic indicators measured at an aggregate level have a significant 
influence on the respondent’s assessment of progress in developing a more democratic 





The aim of this paper was to empirically investigate possible interactions between economic 
variables and the satisfaction people express regarding the progress that has been made in 
democratisation. After documenting the development of satisfaction with political 
transformation over time and countries, we have analysed a combination of micro and macro 
variables reflecting economic conditions in an appropriately adjusted ordered logit regression 
model. We found that both subjective and objective micro influences, specifically relative 
income position, development and expectation of financial situation, and objective macro 
influences, namely inflation, GDP per capita index and private sector share, have a robust and 
significant influence.  
The main general conclusion which can be drawn from these results is that people's opinion 
towards political transformation is influenced by economic conditions, both at an individual 
and an aggregate level. This immediately raises the concern that those studies in the literature 
that focus on the analysis of the effects of the political system on economic performance are 
subject to an endogeneity bias, which may invalidate those results. Hence a proper analysis of 
the interaction between democratisation and economic performance should take the 
simultaneity into account, either by using instruments or by specifying a full-fledged 
simultaneous equation model.  
Moreover, the distinction between political and economic transformation may not be very 
helpful in practice, as people in Eastern Europe evaluate political transformation conditional 
on the developments in the economic system. So the choice of an “Asian way” to transition 
appears to be not very realistic, and transformation countries in Eastern Europe have little  
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choice but to meet the challenge of having to transform their economic and political systems 
at the same time. What clearly comes out in this paper is that transition countries, if they want 
to keep satisfaction with democratisation reasonably high, have to make progress in their 
economic development. Perhaps the situation in Russia is a good example to make that point. 
The election of Vladimir Putin as President in Spring 2000 may be viewed as a return to more 
authoritarian political structures and as an outcome of widespread dissatisfaction with the 
performance of the democratic political system as implemented so far. In the light of our 
results it is tempting to interpret the loss in satisfaction in democratisation as mirroring the 
difficulties of the Russian economy. If that was true then the recovery of the Russian 
economy will be crucial in sustaining support for the creation of a democratic political 
system.  
Finally, I would interpret the findings in this study as empirical evidence suggesting that the 
treatment of the economic and political systems as separate entities is unlikely to be very 
useful when it comes to developing practical policy conclusions. But the importance of 
deriving useful policy prescriptions for a successful transformation process warrants further 
research on the interactions of economics and politics in the phase of transition.  
                                                                                                                                                   





Tab. A: Surveys Across Time and Countries 
Surveys  CEEB1  CEEB2  CEEB3  CEEB4  CEEB5  CEEB6  CEEB7 
ZA-No.  2253, 2256, 
2257 
2251  2321  2474  2577  2802  2924 
Year  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 
Albania    X  X  X  X  X  X 
Armenia      X  X  X  X  X 
Belarus      X  X  X  X  X 
Bulgaria    X  X  X  X  X  X 
Croatia            X  X 
Czech  X  X  X  X  X  X  X 
Estonia    X  X  X  X  X  X 
Georgia      X    X  X  X 
Hungary  X  X  X  X  X  X  X 
Kazakhstan          X  X  X 
Latvia    X  X  X  X  X  X 
Lithuania    X  X  X  X  X  X 
Macedonia      X  X  X  X  X 
Moldova      X         
Poland  X  X  X  X  X  X  X 
Romania    X  X  X  X  X  X 
Russia    X  X  X  X  X  X 
Slovakia  X  X  X  X  X  X  X 
Slovenia      X  X  X  X  X 
Ukraine      X  X  X  X  X 
Yugoslavia              X 
Note: The primary data are available, for example, from the “Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung” 
(ZA) in Cologne, and as additional information ZA-classification codes are listed in the second line. The data for 
Czechs and Slovaks over the period 1990-92 are based on filtering the respondents in Czechoslovakia according 
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